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An article on Justice Rand’s commercial law jurisprudence provides a number of 
challenges. Much has been made of his contributions in constitutional law and the 
impact of “policy considerations” on freedoms of speech and religion.1 His voice, 
it has been said, “reverberates even in our most recent constitutional jurisprudence, 
be it federalism, civil liberty or social justice.”2 His decision in Roncarelli v. 
Duplessis3 stands as a classic in constitutional law, leading one author to conclude that 
“during his time on the Supreme Court of Canada, Justice Rand almost stands alone 
among Canadian judges as the most aggressive and assertive defender of individual 
liberties.”4 Yet little has been said of his contribution to the commercial field. Justice 
Rand participated in sixty-nine broadly classed commercial law and contracts cases.5
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Press, 1969) at 262.
2 “Biography of Ivan C. Rand”, online: University of New Brunswick <http://law.unb.ca/ 
library/BiographyofRand.php>.
3 [1959] S.C.R. 121; See also Saumur v. Quebec (City), [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299 (religious freedom 
a foundational component of any political organization); David M. Brown, “Freedom from 
or Freedom for?: Religion as a Case Study in Defining the Content of Charter Rights” (2000)
33 University o f British Columbia Law Review 551.
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Law Journal 149 (Justice Rand’s observations on the role of the court and the executive “still 
resonate in the twenty-first century”).
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Does Justice Rand’s commercial law jurisprudence have a legacy? This essay seeks to 
answer that question.
What constitutes “commercial law” is open to debate.6 In Canadian law 
schools, there are a variety of approaches to its teaching. Sales, consumer protection, 
secured transactions, banking and bankruptcy may all find a home in a broad 
commercial law survey course. Alternatively, instructors may teach each of these 
topics as stand-alone courses. This paper does not examine every facet of commercial 
law. Nor does it purport to cover corporate law,7 banking law8, intellectual property9 or 
restitution.10 Roy Goode suggests that commercial law is “that branch of law which is 
concerned with rights and duties arising from the supply of goods and services in the 
way of trade.”11 This definition implies that commercial law’s core consists of sales, 
secured transactions along with underlying contract principles. To this list, one can add 
bankruptcy law, as each commercial transaction raises the possibility of the financial 
failure of one of the parties.12
Even after narrowing a definition of commercial law to contracts, sales, 
secured transactions and bankruptcy law, one must consider the impact of significant 
statutory reform since Justice Rand’s time on the Supreme Court of Canada. Thus, 
what he had to say about conditional sales contracts will be mere history to a twenty- 
first century commercial lawyer practicing secured transactions. Personal property 
security legislation has revolutionized the law of conditional sales, floating charges 
and chattel mortgages in each of the common law provinces and territories.13 Thus,
Brunswick’s website. “Subject Guide to Supreme Court of Canada Judicial Decisions by Rand”, 
online: University of New Brunswick <http://law.unb.ca/library/Randcasessubjectguide. 
php>.
6 Justice Rand’s decisions on the University of New Brunswick’s website have been classified 
by subject matter including “commercial law”, now printed here infra at pp. 323 et seq. 
However, this essay takes a much narrower view of commercial law.
7 Gatineau Power Co. v. Crown Life Insurance Co., [1945] S.C.R. 655; International Power 
Co. v. McMaster University, [1946] S.C.R. 178; Oxford Paper Co. v. Inverness (County), 
[1948] S.C.R. 115; Rathie v. Montreal Trust Company, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 204; Ghimpelman v. 
Bercovici, [1957] S.C.R. 128.
8 Niles v. Lake, [1947] S.C.R. 291.
9 Spun Rock Wools Ltd. v. Fiberglas Canada Ltd., [1943] S.C.R. 547, Rand J., dissenting.
10 Deglman v Guaranty Trust Co. o f Canada and Constantineau, [1954] S.C.R. 725. Stephen 
Waddams links Deglman to the modem revival of restitution as a “flexible and growing 
system” in Canada: Stephen Waddams, The Law o f Contracts, 5th ed. (Toronto: Canada Law 
Book Inc., 2005) at para. 359. See also G. H. L. Fridman, The Law o f Contract in Canada, 5th 
ed. (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2006) at 32-33 (evolution of extra-contractual remedy first 
approved by the SCC in Deglman).
11 R. M. Goode, Commercial Law, 3rd ed., (London: LexisNexis, 2004) at 8.
12 Consumer law is excluded from this essay as many of the modem consumer statutes were 
enacted after Justice Rand left the bench.
13 Ronald C. C. Cuming, Catherine Walsh, Roderick J. Wood, Personal Property Security Law
this essay need not consider cases14 involving the various statutory and common law 
regimes governing secured transactions prior to such enactments or other commercial 
statutes or regulations that have long been repealed.15 Finally, there are too few sales 
cases to identify any trends. The Supreme Court of Canada did not consider any 
general principles arising under provincial Sale of Goods legislation.16 Therefore, the 
law of contracts and of bankruptcy will be the focus of this article.
A final challenge is that Justice Rand’s commercial law decisions may not 
have raised matters of national importance, given that Rand’s time on the bench pre­
dated the 1975 abolition of appeals as of right in civil matters.17 The unrestricted 
right of appeal had led the court to devote a “disproportionate amount of its time 
and effort disposing of issues which raised no new or important questions for the 
country.”18 Despite these restrictions, a commentary on Justice Rand’s commercial law 
jurisprudence helps “complete the judicial profile” of one of Canada’s most important 
jurists.19 It offers insights into a largely ignored aspect of Justice Rand’s opinions and 
a perspective on Canadian commercial law in his time.
A) LAW OF CONTRACTS
One work suggested that, although Justice Rand had a “well-defined and developed 
background theory” in civil rights cases, in common law matters “there appears to be no 
background theory and, perhaps because of this, very few notable accomplishments.”
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005) at 1 - 4.
14 Traders Finance Corp. Ltd. v. Williams, [1956] S.C.R. 694; Canadian Acceptance Corporation 
Ltd. v. Contractors Supplies Ltd. (Liquidator of), [1958] S.C.R. 546.
15 Gold Export Act, S.C. 1932, c. 33: Canada v. Williams, [1944] S.C.R. 226; The Special War 
Revenue Act, R.S.C. 1927, c. 179: Canada v. Dominion Engineering Co. Ltd., [1944] S.C.R. 
371; Consolidated Regulations Respecting Trading with the Enemy (1939), ss. 28(1) and 
44(1): Canada (Secretary o f State) v. De Rothschild, [1946] S.C.R. 403; Income War Tax Act, 
R.S.C. 1927, c. 97: Mahaffy v. Canada (Minister o f National Revenue), [1946] S.C.R. 450.
16 Canadian Atlas Diesel Engines Co. Ltd. v. McLeod Engines Ltd., [1952] 2 S.C.R. 122; Cie 
d ‘Entrepreneurs en Construction Ltee. v. Simard, [1952] 2 S.C.R. 444; Canadian Indemnity 
Insurance Co. v. Andrews & George Co., [1953] 1 S.C.R. 19.
17 Greenbank v. National Supply Co. Ltd., [1944] S.C.R. 59 (mechanic’s lien, which has never 
since been cited).
18 E. M. Pollock, “Mr. Justice Rand: A Triumph of Principle” (1975) 53 Canadian Bar Review 
519, at 524.
19 Jacob Ziegel’s review of Bora Laskin’s commercial, contract and corporate law jurisprudence 
begins by noting the number of similar obstacles and challenges facing an author asked to 
review an important public law figure. Jacob S. Ziegel, “Bora Laskin’s Contributions to 
Commercial, Contract and Corporate Law” (1985) 35 University o f Toronto Law Journal 
392, at 393.
He was according to this same work, “a member of a court which was not noted for 
breathtaking advances in the common law.”20
There are few extra-judicial writings to discern Justice Rand’s approach to 
the common law. He articulated his vision of the common law and the role of the 
courts, asking “what means are there which justify modifications of the common 
law?” Justice Rand presented a more modem conception of common law thinking 
than existed in nineteenth century England:
Today we have something else. We are introducing social considerations.
We are beginning to see that the common law really is pushing forward 
under the urge of changing social demands and as it pushes ahead, it has 
behind it the accumulated judicial experience.21
Because the laws cannot change every day and the courts are bound to be 
proceeding backwards, they are looking at the past and are not anticipating 
possible changes but are viewing actual changes. We then come to see the 
scope that is open to any Court of Appeal as well as the Supreme Court of 
Canada to modify the law.22
Justice Rand concluded, “we are reaching the stage where we can safely trust our 
highest tribunal to the exercise, the application of our common law as an instrument 
of modification.”23
One might expect this judicial philosophy to pervade his common law 
decisions. This openness to modifications in the common law was best articulated 
in his two landmark judgments in Union Steamships Ltd. v. Barnes24 and Dawson v. 
Helicopter Exploration Co. Ltd.25 In Barnes, Justice Rand found himself in dissent; 
and yet the principles he articulated have found implicit resonance with more recent 
developments in exclusion clauses. Modem courts have come to rely upon Dawson, 
which is perhaps Justice Rand’s signature contracts case. That decision continues to be 
cited for the principle that courts should seek to find a promissory bilateral agreement, 
binding on both parties, rather than an offer of a unilateral contract. These two 
decisions will be discussed below. However, Barnes and Dawson remain exceptions.
20 Randall Balcome, et. al., supra note 4, at 110.
21 Ivan C. Rand, “The Role of Supreme Court in Society” (1991) 40 U.N.B.L.J. 173, at 180.
22 Ibid., at 182.
23 Ibid., at 192.
24 [1956] S.C.R. 842.
25 [1955] S.C.R. 868.
Many of the Court’s contracts cases made modest and somewhat unremarkable 
contributions to contracts jurisprudence. Judgments were short and in many instances, 
the Court cited few authorities. Other cases involved interpretation of a detailed set of 
facts or contractual terms,26 leaving little room to break new ground or establish path 
breaking contract principles.27
Some decisions pre-dated significant common law developments. For 
example, Salmon River Logging Co. v. Burt2* considered the scope of an exclusion 
clause. This 1953 decision came well before the judicial debate in England over the 
doctrine of fundamental breach and its effect on exclusion clauses.29 The Supreme 
Court of Canada in Tercon Contractors Ltd. v. British Columbia (Transportation 
and Highways).30 would later adopt a new framework for exclusion clauses. The 
Court in Tercon (2010) has concluded that the time had come to lay the doctrine of 
fundamental breach “to rest’.31 Under the new three-part test the Court first asked 
whether the exclusion clause applied to the circumstances in the case. If the clause did 
apply, Justice Binnie went further and asked whether or not the exclusion clause was 
“unconscionable at the time the contract was made”.32 Finally, if the clause was still 
valid at that stage, the Court could refuse to enforce an otherwise valid clause “because 
of the existence of an overriding public policy...that outweighs the very strong public 
interest in the enforcement of contracts.”33
In Salmon River, the Court refused to give effect to an exclusion clause and 
applied a construction approach. In the case, a logging company contracted with a 
trucking company to haul logs. The negligence of the logging company’s employees 
let a tree fall on one of the trucking company’s trucks. When the trucking company
26 Bellavance v. Orange Crush Ltd., [1955] S.C.R. 706.
27 Farah v. Barki, [1955] S.C.R. 107 (fraudulent misrepresentation); Scharfenberg v. Kortes,
[1956] S.C.R. 273 (substantial performance). Justice Rand also concurred in two cases J.A. 
Gosselin Ltd. v. Péloquin, [1957] S.C.R. 15 (fraud); Lambert v. Levis Automobiles Inc.,
[1957] S.C.R. 621 (nullity of contract).
28 [1953] 2 S.C.R. 117.
29 Karsales (Harrow) Ltd. v. Wallis, [1956] 2 All E.R. 866 (C.A.); Suisse Atlantique Société 
d ’Armement Maritime S.A. v. N.V. Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale, [1967] 1 A.C. 361 (H.L.); 
Harbutt’s "Plasticine” Ltd. v. Wayne Tank & Pump Co. Ltd., [1970] 1 Q.B. 447 (C.A.); Photo 
Production Ltd. v. Securicor Transport Ltd., [1980] A.C. 827 (H.L.). See John McCamus, 
The Law o f Contracts (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005) at 754-764.
30 (2010), 315 D.L.R. (4th) 385 (S.C.C.); also Hunter Engineering Co. Inc. v. Syncrude Canada 
Ltd., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 426; Fraser Jewellers (1982) Ltd. v. Dominion Electric Protection 
Co. (1997), 34 O.R. (3d) 1 (C.A.); Solway v. Davis Moving & Storage Inc. (c.o.b. Kennedy 
Moving & Storage Inc. (2002), 62 O.R. (3d) 522 (C.A.); Plas-Tex Canada Ltd. v. Dow 
Chemical o f Canada Ltd. (2004), 245 D.L.R. (4th) 650 (Alta. C.A.).
31 Tercon, ibid., at para. 62.
32 Ibid., at para. 122.
33 Ibid., at para. 123.
pursued a claim in negligence, the logging company relied on an exclusion clause. 
A majority of the court held that the exclusion clause did not apply. The contractual 
obligations only involved loading, hauling and dumping of the logs. Although 
negligence by the logging company’s employees damaged the truck, the damage did 
not arise in the context of loading. Cartwright J. concluded that the loading operation 
did not “fall within the four comers of the contract”, even though “it was being carried 
on “in the immediate vicinity of the truck.” Justice Rand adopted a similar view. The 
exclusion clause related only to the damage “arising out of the use or operations of the 
said trucks.”34
The accident here was not of the nature so envisaged; it arose out of work 
carried on exclusively by the [logging] Company; the fact that the truck 
was in its vicinity awaiting loading cannot in any sense stamp the resulting 
damage as arising out of that fact.35
The construction approach would later find favour in the House of Lords 
in Photo Production.36 In Salmon, there was no discussion of unconscionability or 
even the public policy factors found in the recent case of Tercon. Justice Rand’s 
construction approach was in sharp contrast to his judgment in Barnes.
In Barnes the court split 3-237 in favour of upholding an exclusion clause. 
Justice Rand’s dissenting judgment was a stinging commentary on the approach of 
the majority judgment of Locke J. A steamship operated by the appellant carried 
passengers and cargo on the west coast of British Columbia. The respondent and 
family boarded the appellant’s vessel to purchase the tickets, because the appellant 
did not maintain a ticket facility on shore. In cross-examination, the respondent said 
that on receiving the ticket he knew there was some writing on the front of the ticket 
but he did not read it. Nor did he look on the back of the ticket. The front of the ticket 
contained the following in red print:
This ticket is issued subject to the conditions of carriage of passengers and 
baggage endorsed on the back hereof and those posted in the Company’s 
office.
The following statement appeared on the other side of the ticket, also in red
print:
34 Salmon River Logging Co. v. Burt, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 117, at para. 5.
35 Ibid., at paras. 1 and 5.
36 Photo Production Ltd. v. Securicor Transport Ltd., [1980] A.C. 827 (H.L.).
37 Cartwright J. also dissented in a separate and brief judgment.
.. .[T]he person using [the ticket] assumes all risk of loss or injury to person 
or property while on the vessel or while embarking or disembarking, even 
though such loss or injury is caused by the negligence or default of the 
shipowner, its servants or agents, or otherwise howsoever.
The holder hereof in accepting this ticket thereby agrees to all the conditions 
stipulated thereon.38
Wanting to retrieve some items out of his luggage the respondent made his way to the 
ship’s hold. En route, the respondent fell down a hatchway and suffered injuries. The 
appellant had failed to keep the hatchway sufficiently lit.
Locke J. held that the exclusion clause applied. In looking to earlier English 
authorities, Locke J. found the judgment in Nunan v. Southern Railway Company39 
to best summarize the general principles in this area. In Nunan, Swift J. concluded 
that when a contract was formed by delivery of a document, stating the terms of the 
contract and its limits, such a form must be considered the offer of the party who 
tendered the document. If the form was accepted by the other side without objection, 
this act amounted to acceptance of the offer, “whether he reads the document or 
otherwise informs himself of its contents or not.”40 In this situation, the conditions in 
the document were binding. If there was any dispute about the true intentions of the 
parties then a court must determine whether the party delivering the form or ticket 
gave reasonable notice to the other party.
For Locke J., the admission by the respondent that he saw writing on the front 
of the ticket was crucial:
I think he must be taken to be thereby affected with knowledge that what 
was written referred to the contract of carriage and with notice of what 
would have been disclosed had he read it.41
Locke J. rejected the notion that the respondent had no reasonable opportunity 
to read the ticket. Here there was reasonable notice of the limiting conditions on the 
ticket because:
.. .the endorsement on the face of the ticket printed in red ink and referring 
to the conditions endorsed on its reverse side constituted a reasonable 
attempt to bring to the passenger’s attention the terms of the contract and
38 Union Steamships Ltd. v. Barnes, [1956] S.C.R. 842, at 849.
39 [1923] 2 K.B. 703.
40 Ibid., at 707.
41 Supra note 38, at 856.
I consider that his acceptance of the ticket without protest and embarking 
upon the voyage precludes him from reprobating its terms, relying upon the 
fact that he did not read it.42
The suggestion that the respondent was fixed with knowledge of the terms on the ticket 
became a focal point of Justice Rand’s dissent.
Justice Rand began his decision noting that the respondent purchased the 
tickets on board but after the boat had left the dock. He also found that the respondent 
noticed printing on the front of the ticket but did not read it. Unlike Locke J., Justice 
Rand put the transaction in context. It was 5:00 am and the respondent “was in a hurry 
to get his children abed which called for some clothes in the baggage.”43 Justice Rand 
characterized the issue to be answered not as a mere legal issue but rather a higher 
principle: “ ...was what was done by the carrier reasonably sufficient to bring to the 
attention of the passenger... this exceptional condition?”44 For Justice Rand the terms 
of the ticket were “extreme and unusual”, leading him to claim that it was “absurd” 
to think that the shipping company had given reasonable notice in light of the hurried 
nature of the transaction. Justice Rand made the context of the transaction the main 
point of his judgment:
In the circumstances here it seems almost absurd to say that the passenger, 
already on his voyage, can be said to have been given reasonable notice 
of such an extreme and unusual term of the ticket, or, as it is put, that the 
carrier had taken reasonable steps to bring it to his attention. Everything 
was hurried; his getting aboard, the vessel getting under weigh [j /'c], the 
purchase of the tickets with the steward at his elbow, the settling of the 
family in the stateroom and the hastening for the baggage. One has only to 
imagine the incongruity of stopping to examine a ticket in such surroundings 
to ascertain its terms.45
Where Locke J. found that the respondent should be fixed with knowledge, Justice 
Rand invoked notions of “incongruity.” Surely, no reasonable person would stop to 
examine the ticket for terms in the context of the hurried events. He went one-step 
further when considering whether anyone would stop to examine the ticket in that 
context: “by no person and none would anticipate such a condition.”46
Beyond criticism of the contract terms and the context of the transaction, 
Justice Rand took direct aim at the business practices of the shipping line. Since the
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid., at 844.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid., at 845.
46 Ibid.
shipping line was carrying passengers only at their own risk, Justice Rand speculated, 
“one would have thought that common candour would make this known not by 
small letters on a small ticket but, at least in addition, by means that would make 
that important fact known almost to the dullest.”47 He asked, why would the shipping 
company “object to advertising its terms in the suggested manner?”48 He could think 
of no reason other than that “such an advertisement would not promote patronage.”49 
The printed tickets containing words on each side would mean that passengers did not 
read the conditions and that there was no reason for the shipping company “to provoke 
discussion on the matter unnecessarily.”50 The shipping company could point out the 
limiting conditions to the passenger whenever an injury occurred.51 “Accidents would 
be relatively few and injuries would not be as objectionable a means of publication 
as the open notice.”52 None of the other justices found that there had been any 
misrepresentation on the part of the steamship company. However, Justice Rand came 
close. In concluding that the exclusion clause should not be given effect, he stated, 
“such a conditioned service could amount to a virtual deception of passengers.”53
What led Justice Rand to condemn the practices of the steamship company in 
such strong terms? It was not just a question of whether the respondent had received 
reasonable notice of limiting terms on the ticket. It was a question of a rule of law; and 
once Justice Rand peeled away the layers of the business practices of the steamship 
line, he discovered “virtual deception.” There were clues to Justice Rand’s point of 
view in the House of Lords decision that he cited. Hood v. Anchor Line54 considered 
a steamship ticket with limiting terms. Although the House of Lords found that the 
steamship line had taken all reasonable steps to bring the terms to the attention of 
the passenger, Viscount Haldane found that there was a duty of the steamship line to 
passengers. That duty depended upon an accepted standard of conduct. Under that 
duty:
...a reasonable man ought to behave in these circumstances towards the
neighbour towards whom he is bound by the necessities of the community







53 Ibid. On the effects of misrepresentation on exclusion clauses, see Curtis v. Chemical 
Drycleaning & Dyeing Co., [1951] 1 K.B. 805 (C.A.).
54 [1918] A.C. 837.
55 [1918] A.C. 837, at 843.
Such an approach would not permit the “virtual deception” that had occurred 
in Barnes. Necessities of community to act with forbearance and consideration would 
seem to preclude a steamship line from hiding behind a ticket that a patron had not 
read or understood.
Justice Rand found Henderson, et al. (Steam-Packet Company) v. Stevenson56 
to be “peculiarly apposite in indicating the background of general considerations in 
which the question is to be viewed.”57
When a company desires to impose special and most stringent terms 
upon its customers, in exoneration of its own liability, there is nothing 
unreasonable in requiring that those terms shall be distinctly declared and 
deliberately accepted.... and if the effect of your Lordships’ affirmation 
of the interlocutor of the Lord Ordinary be to compel some precaution of 
this kind, it will be manifestly advantageous in promoting the harmonious 
action of the law, and in protecting the ignorant and the unwary.58
For Justice Rand, this was not a mere matter of construction. Whether the 
clause was part of the contract was “ancillary to the equities of the situation.” If the 
steamship owner had a responsibility to ensure that the passengers arrived safely, “this 
proposition could only be rebutted where the owner had made a concerted effort to 
bring contrary policies to the customer’s attention.”59
Justice Rand’s protection of the unwary in a hurried transaction brings to 
mind modem approaches to the interpretation of exclusion clauses in Canada. One 
might draw an analogy to concepts of “unconscionability” and “public policy” found 
in Tercon Contractors Ltd. v. British Columbia (Transportation and Highways).60 
Similarly, in Tilden Rent-A-Car Co. v. ClendenningM the Ontario Court of Appeal, in 
referring to an exclusion clause in a signed contract, refused to uphold the clause. The 
court noted that the car rental agreement had been carried out in a “hurried, informal 
manner.”62
Dawson v. Helicopter Exploration Co. Ltd.63 was the high-water mark in 
Justice Rand’s contracts jurisprudence. Was a series of letters exchanged between 
the parties a binding bilateral contract or was there merely an offer of an unilateral
56 (1875), L.R. 2 H.L. Sc. 470.
57 Supra note 38, at 846.
58 (1875), L.R. 2 H.L. Sc. 470, at 481, Lord O’Hagan [emphasis added],
59 Randall Balcome, et. al., supra note 4, at 107.
60 Supra note 30.
61 (1978), 18 O.R. (2d) 601 (C.A.).
62 Ibid., at para. 23.
63 [1955] S.C.R. 868.
contract that could be withdrawn at any time prior to performance? Dawson, a mining 
engineer, discovered a mineral deposit in British Columbia and contacted Helicopter 
Exploration about exploiting the property. The parties exchanged correspondence 
about financing of the exploration and payment to Dawson for showing the company 
the location of the mineral deposit. In the end, Helicopter Exploration pursued the 
claim on its own without informing Dawson. When Dawson sued for breach of 
contract, Helicopter Exploration argued that the correspondence only evidenced a 
unilateral offer that was to be accepted by Dawson through performance. According 
to Helicopter Exploration, the unilateral offer could be revoked at any time prior to 
Dawson’s act of taking Helicopter Exploration to the site. This would leave Dawson, 
the offeree, without a remedy.64 Justice Rand found Helicopter’s reasoning erroneous. 
In the unilateral context, the “offer contemplates acts to be performed” by the offeree 
while “the offeror remains passive”65 This was not the situation here.
He concluded that the terms proposed involved action on the part of both 
parties and thus found a bilateral contract. Earlier jurisprudence strengthened this 
conclusion, as it was “the tendency of courts to treat offers as calling for bilateral rather 
than unilateral action when the language can be fairly so construed.”66 As a unilateral 
contract might be revoked at anytime before complete performance, many courts had 
adopted a “promissory construction where that can be reasonably given.”67 A bilateral 
agreement enabled the parties “to close a business bargain on the strength of which 
they may, thereafter, plan their courses.”68 Once the court transformed the unilateral 
offer into a bilateral contract, “the offeror is bound if the offeree performs or is willing 
to perform.”69 In a bilateral situation, the contract formed immediately and both parties 
were bound to carry out their obligations.70 Given that a unilateral contract “can put 
the offeree at an extreme disadvantage an attitude to such contracts which puts the 
onus of showing the parties arrangement was unilateral and not bilateral on the offeror 
can be justified.”71
However, in reaching his conclusion, that there was a binding bilateral 
agreement, Justice Rand did not limit his judgment to a consideration of English case 
law.72 Two significant American authorities enriched his opinion. First, he quoted from
64 Angela Swan, Canadian Contract Law, 2nd ed. (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2009) at 100.
65 Dawson v. Helicopter Exploration Co. Ltd., [1955] S.C.R. 868, at para. 23.
66 Ibid., at para. 25.
67 Ibid. For an examination of the history of unilateral contracts, see R Tiersma, “Reassessing 
Unilateral Contracts: the Role of Offer, Acceptance and Promise” (1992) 26 University o f 
California Davis Law Review 1.
68 Supra note 65, at para. 25.
69 Angela Swan, supra note 64, at 100.
70 Randall Balcome, et. al., supra note 4, at 105.
71 Angela Swan, supra note 64, at 100.
72 The Moorcock ( 1889), 14 P.D. 64.
the leading American text, Williston on Contracts.73 Secondly, he cited Cardozo J.’s 
judgment in the well-known New York Court of Appeals case of Wood v. Lady Lucy 
Duff Gordon.74 The two American authorities signified a shift away from formalism.
According to Williston:
Doubtless wherever possible, as a matter o f interpretation, a court would 
and should interpret an offer as contemplating a bilateral rather than a 
unilateral contract, since in a bilateral contract both parties are protected 
from a period prior to the beginning of performance on either side — that is 
from the making of the mutual promises.75
Williston noted that, at the beginning of the twentieth century, courts were 
looking for clear promises on each side in order to find a bilateral contract. However, 
the 1936 edition of Williston on Contracts noted that “courts are now more readily to 
recognize fair implications as effective.”76 Justice Rand strengthened that point by 
quoting Cardozo J.’s judgment rejecting a formalistic approach:
The law has outgrown its primitive stage of formalism when the precise 
word was the sovereign talisman, and every slip was fatal. A promise may 
be lacking and yet the whole writing may be ‘instinct with obligation’ 
imperfectly expressed.77
Justice Rand would later review Dawson with University of New Brunswick 
law students to illustrate the court’s role in modifying the law. In his lecture, Rand 
asked the students whether there was a bilateral agreement or a unilateral offer? “Did 
the company agree to anything? Did it agree to accept [Dawson’s] services to the 
exclusion of any other person? Did they agree to forebear any search until he had had 
his opportunity to lead them to it?”
73 Samuel Williston, A Treatise on the Law o f Contracts, vol. 1 (New York: Baker & Voorhis, 
1936) at 76-77.
74 222 N.Y. 88 (1917). Two American authors refer to Dawson as one of the few foreign cases 
to cite Lady Duff Gordon. See Robert A. Hillman ‘“ Instinct with an Obligation’ and the 
‘Normative Ambiguity of Rhetorical Power’” (1995) 56 Ohio State Law Journal 775, at 776; 
Robert C. Bird, “An Employment Contract ‘Instinct with an Obligation’: Good Faith Costs 
and Contexts” (2008), 28 Pace Law Review 409, at 412.
75 Samuel Williston, supra note 73, at 76-77.
76 Ibid.
11 Supra note 74, at 98. Not all commentators have agreed with the “instinct with obligation” 
philosophy. Professor Fridman raised the concern that this approach “would tend to give too 
paternalistic a role to the courts.” He was of the view that “as it is there is much scope for 
judicial creativity and interference in interpreting the language and conduct of the parties” 
to determine whether the parties had reached a contract: G. H. L. Fridman, The Law o f 
Contracts, 5th ed. (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2006) at 25.
But where do you draw the line? There is no way of drawing the line at all 
unless you say that they agree that he should have that exclusive right to 
lead them to this mine if he could. And the Supreme Court held that that was 
a bilateral contract arising out of the necessary implication of what passed 
between the two parties. There was an emphasis placed upon the fact that a 
business relationship of that sort is intended to be effective and that it can be 
effective by bringing out in objective form what is necessarily implied in the 
relations between them for what was understood but not spoken.78
He concluded by stating: “That is a good example of how the law of contract 
can be extended by implication from the actual circumstances of the dealings between 
the two men.”79 Rather than follow the formal rule that unilateral offers might be 
revoked at any time, the rule was ignored in favour of finding a bilateral contract.80 The 
result in Dawson effectively “destroyed” the offeror’s power to revoke “by the simple 
expedient of finding that there was a bilateral contract.”81
However, not all commentators have agreed that the finding of a bilateral 
contract is always possible. Although courts have expressed a tendency to find a 
bilateral contract, “in some cases the only reasonable interpretation of the facts is that 
the offeror bargained only for a completed act.”82 It might be easy to find a bilateral 
contract where there had been a series of letters documenting the parties’ position as 
in Dawson. On the other hand, it might be more difficult to find a bilateral contract in 
the case of an offer of a reward for a lost pet.83 Further, the imposition of a bilateral 
contract might not always represent the parties’ expectations in that “they may have 
agreed that the offer could be withdrawn at anytime before the completion of the act 
that is acceptance.”84 But on the facts in Dawson, Justice Rand must have believed 
that he was granting to the plaintiff what he expected under the contract. The result 
protected “the plaintiff’s expectation interests.”85 Indeed, if Justice Rand began, not 
with the question of whether there was a contract but rather whether Dawson ought 
to recover, then the answer was obvious.86 Whether he extended the common law 
or merely responded to one legal doctrine with another remains an open question. 
However, he reached a decision that was “arguably the best possible resolution of the 
problem at hand.”87
78 Ivan C. Rand, supra note 21, at 183.
79 Ibid.
80 John Swan, “Consideration and the Reasons for Enforcing Contracts”, in Barry J. Reiter and 
John Swan (eds.), Studies in Contract Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1980) at 43.
81 Ibid., at 44.
82 Stephen Waddams, supra note 10, at para 157.
83 John Swan, supra note 80, at 44.
84 Ibid., at 45.
85 Ibid.
86 Randall Balcome, et. al., supra note 4, at 106.
87 Ibid., at 104.
Dawson continues to have an impact on modem jurisprudence. The Supreme 
Court of Canada in Sail Labrador Ltd. v. Challenge One (The)** referred to Dawson 
noting “this Court has previously approved of the tendency by courts to treat offers as 
calling for bilateral rather than unilateral performance whenever a contract can fairly 
be so construed.”89 Justice Cardozo’s phrase “instinct with obligation”, which featured 
in Justice Rand’s judgment, has also been considered in other Canadian cases.90 In 
Great Eastern Oil & Import Co. Ltd. v. Chafe91 the plaintiff argued that there was “a 
lack of mutuality of obligation.” Citing Dawson the court held that:
It should be taken that the parties intended that the agreement have business 
efficacy and, while a specific promise by the plaintiff is lacking, the whole 
writing is “instinct with an obligation” imperfectly expressed which is 
regarded as supplying the necessary reciprocal promise.92
On balance, Justice Rand issued far more unremarkable contracts decisions 
than Barnes and Dawson. Although he emphasized that the common law was open for 
modification, that principle was rarely applied. However, when the facts provided him 
with an opportunity to embrace that principle, as they did in Barnes and Dawson, he 
illustrated a much more dynamic form of reasoning.
B) BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY LAW
Bankruptcy law has long sought to satisfy two general objectives. First, the legislation 
provides for distribution of the bankrupt’s assets to creditors. Secondly, it discharges 
the bankrupt’s liabilities.93 Bankruptcy law also includes questions of priority. Some 
creditors are given enhanced or special status under the legislation. This section of this 
article begins with the priority question and examines Justice Rand’s contribution in 
the area of unpaid employees. The article concludes with a discussion of the discharge 
and demonstrates how modem thinking about the discharge has radically changed 
from earlier periods. Discharge was not always available as part of the bankruptcy 
regime and an historical discussion will provide context to Justice Rand’s own views 
on this topic.
88 [1999] 1 S.C.R. 265.
89 Ibid., at para. 41; also Can-Euro Investments Ltd. v. Industrial Alliance Insurance (2009), 273 
N.S.R. (2d) 325 (S.C.), at para. 104.
90 Martynekv. Hinton, [1976] A.J. No. 230 (Dist. Ct.), at para. 10; Bergen v. Billingham, [1972]
28 D.L.R. (3d) 99 (Man. Q.B.), at para. 25. Cf Degoesbriand v. Radford, [1985] 41 Sask. R.
43 (Q.B.), at paras. 14-15 (court holding that plaintiff had failed to establish defendant had 
made a binding reciprocal promise).
91 [1956] 4 D.L.R. (2d) 310 (Nfld. S.C.).
92 Ibid., at para. 12.
93 Anthony Duggan, Stephanie-Ben Ishai, Thomas Telfer, Roderick Wood and Jacob Ziegel, 
Canadian Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law: Cases, Text, and Materials (Toronto: Emond 
Montgomery, 2009) at 26.
1. Unpaid Employees
The position of unpaid employees in a bankruptcy has always posed a significant 
policy problem for Parliament. Unlike other creditors, employees are likely the last to 
know that a firm is failing. Employees are not able to diversify their credit risk and are 
unable to switch employers at the first sign of trouble.94 Parliament has long grappled 
with how best to protect unpaid wage claims. Traditionally, the Bankruptcy and 
Insolvency Act95 (BIA) provided for a preferred claim, i.e., one that would rank behind 
secured creditors but ahead of general unsecured creditors.96 The position of unpaid 
employees has been considerably improved with recent enactment of the Wage Earner 
Protection Program A c f1 ( WEPPA) in 2005 which gives unpaid employees the ability 
to be paid out of the proceeds of current assets up to $2000.98 This new provision will 
provide unpaid wage claimants priority over current asset secured creditors.
Aside from the question of priority, one must consider who is entitled to 
priority. Under the BIA, the person making the claim must be a “clerk, servant, 
travelling salesperson, labourer or worker.”99 The scope of this definition acts as a 
gate-keeping function restricting priority to those who are said to deserve it. Decisions 
issued shortly after the Bankruptcy Act o f  1919m  came into force adopted a liberal 
approach to unpaid wage claims. For example, Re Specialty Bags Co.101 considered 
whether a travelling salesman was entitled to a preferred creditor status:
In my opinion, the statute should be given a wide meaning and the words 
construed liberally. This section of the Act is aimed at protecting one who 
was, three months prior to the bankruptcy, in the employment of the debtor 
as a servant, clerk, travelling salesman, labourer or workman.102
Re Gordean Furniture Co.103 expressly identified the object of the section:
94 Barrette v. Crabtree, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 1027.
95 R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3. [hereafter £A4],
96 BIA s. 136 [prior to 1 July 2008, which was the date of the coming into force of the Wage 
Earner Protection Program Act, S.C .2005, c. 47.] [hereafter WEPPA],
97 S.C. 2005, c. 47.
98 BIA, s. 81.3. See David E. Baird and Ronald B. Davis, “Labour Issues” in Stephanie Ben- 
Ishai and Anthony Duggan, (eds.), Canadian Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law: Bill C-55, 
Statute c. 47 and Beyond (Markham: LexisNexis, 2007) at 68.
99 BIA, s. 81.3.
100 Bankruptcy Act o f 1919, S.C. 1919, c. 36.
101 (1923), 53 O.L.R. 355 (S.C.) aff’d 4 C.B.R. 276 (Ont. C.A.).
102 Ibid., at para. 11. See also Re Vancouver Dress Co., [1931] 3 W.W.R. 220 (B.C. S.C.); Re 
Sexton (1930), 66 O.L.R. 133 (C.A.).
103 Re Gordean Furniture Co., [1923] 4 D.L.R. 1198 (Alta. T.D.).
The purpose of the section seems to be to protect that class of persons 
who depend upon the financial return from their personal services for their 
livelihood to the extent that they have rendered such service to the bankrupt 
or assignor within a specified time.104
In 1946, the scope of the wage earner preferred claim came before the 
Supreme Court of Canada in Guillot v. Lefaivre.m  According to Justice Rand, the 
legal issue was “whether the appellant is a workman within section 121(1) of The 
Bankruptcy Act, and entitled to be preferred as for compensation for services rendered 
to the bankrupt.”106 In this case, the bankrupt had entered into an agreement with the 
appellant whereby the appellant completed brick work and scaffolding. The appellant 
and his three employees completed the work for the bankrupt. The appellant held 
himself out as an entrepreneur and a mason. After completion of the work, the 
appellant paid his employees in full. After the bankruptcy, the appellant submitted a 
priority claim for the appellant’s wages, his employee’s wages (which the appellant 
had paid in full) and a sum for the overall profit. The appellant asserted a preferential 
claim under s. 121 of $1,018.20.
In a brief 5-0 decision, the Court dismissed the appellant’s priority claim. 
Justice Rand rejected the appellant’s argument that he, by way of subrogation, was 
entitled to include in his preferred claim amounts he had paid out to employees. 
Looking to the “plain language” of the statute, Justice Rand concluded that, in order to 
obtain a priority, the claim “must be by ‘a workman’ in respect of ‘services rendered 
to the bankrupt. ”’107Here he found the appellant to be a sub-contractor “in form and 
substance” and not a workman.108 That was the essence of Justice Rand’s short 
decision.
In contrast to the earlier jurisprudence, the plain meaning approach appeared 
to negate the need to appeal to the purpose of the section. However, the relationship 
between the plain meaning and the object of the section was never articulated. Justice 
Rand chose not to discuss the purpose or object of the provision.109 Nor did the Court 
refer to earlier cases that had tended to favour a liberal interpretation of the provision. 
Instead, the Court implicitly adopted a gate-keeping function by restricting, quite
104 Ibid., at para. 28; also Re Corson Shoe Co., [1924] 1 D.L.R. 555 (Ont. S.C.).
105 [1946] S.C.R. 335.
106 Ibid., at para. 27.
107 Ibid., at para. 31.
108 Ibid., at para. 32.
109 The “plain meaning” approach had early origins. See Sussex Peerage Case (1844), 8 E.R. 
1034 (H.L.) cited in R v. McIntosh, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 686. The relationship between the plain 
language approach and one that enables a court to look at the object of the Act is not always 
clear. Randal Graham asks “how ‘clear and plain’ must a statute’s language be before the 
legislative purpose can be ignored?” in Randal N. Graham, Statutory Interpretation: Theory 
and Practice (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2001).
properly in this case, the scope of the provision through statutory interpretation. A 
more explicit form of reasoning, in which the Court articulated the purpose of the 
provision, might have appealed to future courts.110
2. The Bankruptcy Discharge
While Guillot v. Lefaivre might be classified as a straightforward application of 
statutory interpretation, two subsequent decisions would explore the very policy 
underlying the bankruptcy statute. Industrial Acceptance Corp. v. Lalondem and Re 
Moratorium Act112 made significant contributions about the purpose of the bankruptcy 
discharge.
The discharge, which provides a debtor from a release of all debts provable 
in bankruptcy, has a long history. Its original purpose was significantly different 
from modern day conceptions. While one can trace the origins of the first English 
bankruptcy statute to 1543,113 the discharge was not established until early in the 
eighteenth century.114
Limitations on creditors’ collection efforts lay at the heart of the first 
bankruptcy statute enacted in 1543.115 The absence of a collective proceeding at 
common law and the inability of creditors to control the conduct of debtors prompted 
the legislative intervention. The preamble illustrated that the legislation had little to do 
with the concerns of debtors. It spoke of people who:
...craftily obtaining into their hands great substance of other men’s goods, 
do suddenly flee to parts unknown, or keep their houses, not minding to pay 
or restore to any of their creditors, their duties, but at their own wills and 
pleasures consume debts and the substance obtained by credit of other men, 
for their own pleasure and delicate living against all reason, equity, and 
good conscience.116
110 Only three courts have cited Guillot v. Lefaivre: James (Re) (2000), 18 C.B.R. (4th) 220 (B.C. 
S.C.); Mayfair Lumber Co. v. Lamarre (1949), 30 C.B.R. 103 (Q.C. C.S.); Graham v. Magny, 
[1951] R.L. 39 (Q.C. K.B.).
111 [1952] 2 S.C.R. 109.
112 [1955] 5 D.L.R. 736.
113 An Act Against Such Persons As Do Make Bankrupts, 34 & 35 Hen. VIII, c. 4 (1543); see 
William J. Jones, The Foundations o f English Bankruptcy: Statutes and Commissions in the 
Early Modern Period (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1979).
114 An Act to Prevent Frauds Frequently Committed by Bankrupts, 4 & 5 Anne, c. 17 (1706).
115 34 & 35 Henry VIII, c. 4 (1543). See Report o f the Study Committee on Bankruptcy and 
Insolvency Legislation (Canada, 1970), sections 1.1-1.3.
116 34 & 35 Henry VIII, c. 4 (1543), cited in J. Hoppitt, Risk and Failure in English Business, 
1700-1800 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987) at 19. The marginal notes 
adjacent to the preamble in the original statute state, “Evil of Debtors absconding or keeping
The legislation, characterized as a criminal statute, aimed to control 
fraudulent bankrupts. The legislation referred to the bankrupt as an “offender.”117 The 
first bankruptcy statute did not include a discharge.
Subsequent bankruptcy statutes continued to refer to debtors in a pejorative 
way. In 1571, the preamble stated that unless “some better provision be not made for 
the repression of debtors and for a plain declaration...[of] who...ought to be taken 
and deemed a bankrupt” their numbers would increase excessively.118 By 1604, the 
preamble referred to debtors as “frauds and deceits, as new diseases, daily increase.” 
Such debtors “wickedly and wilfully become bankrupts.”119 The 1604 statute included 
the sanction of the pillory and the nailing of the debtor’s ear to the pillory, which 
would then be cut off.120 This sanction applied to debtors who committed perjury by 
failure to disclose their assets to the Commissioners in Bankruptcy.121
In England, the discharge was not available by statute until 1706.122 The 
bankruptcy discharge was often viewed as one essential element of modem bankruptcy 
law. However, the historical context of 1706 made clear that debtor rehabilitation 
was not the prime motivating factor behind the legislation. Its title conveyed a 
purpose other than rehabilitation: An Act to Prevent Frauds Frequently Committed 
by Bankrupts.123 Prior to 1706, the absence of a discharge, and cruelty on the part of 
creditors, encouraged debtor misbehaviour. If the original goal of the Act of 1543 had 
been to prevent debtor fraud, debtors continued to devise ways to avoid their creditors 
and bankruptcy proceedings. The promise of a discharge became the only effective 
way in which to deter fraudulent debtor activity. The discharge, by promising the 
release of debts, would encourage co-operation on the part of the debtor and generate 
more returns for creditors.124 As the discharge provided a form of limited liability, the
House, their Debts unpaid”, 34 & 35 Hen. VIII, c. 4 (1543).
117 Emily Kadens, “The Last Bankrupt Hanged: Balancing Incentives in the Development of 
Bankruptcy Law” (2010) 59 Duke Law Journal 1229, at 1240.
118 13 Elizabeth I, c. 7 (1571), Preamble.
1191 James. I, c. 15 (1604), Preamble.
120 Ibid., s. 9.
121 Ibid., s. 8. See Gino Dal Pont and Lynden Griggs, “The Journey from Ear-Cropping and 
Capital Punishment to the Bankruptcy Legislation Amendment Bill 1995” (1995), 8 
Corporate and Business Law Journal 155.
122 4 & 5 Anne, c. 17(1706).
123 Ibid.
124 Robert Weisberg, “Commercial Morality, the Merchant Character, and the History of the 
Voidable Preference” (1986) 39 Stanford Law Review 3, at 5-9; J. McCoid, “Discharge: The 
Most Important Developments in Bankruptcy History” ( 1996) 70 American Bankruptcy Law 
Journal 163, at 169-172. On the role of Daniel Defoe [1660-1731] see Michael Quilter, 
“Daniel Defoe: Bankrupt and Bankruptcy Reformer” (2004) 25 Journal o f Legal History 53. 
Defoe’s principal commentary on bankruptcy was Essay on Projects (1697).
debtor had a strong incentive to submit to the bankruptcy proceedings.125 Generosity 
to debtors did not motivate Parliament.126 Creditor interests lay at the heart of the 
reform and the change had only a limited beneficial effect on most debtors.127
While the legislation was renowned for its introduction of the discharge, it also 
contained a less well-known feature. In 1706, Parliament made fraudulent bankruptcy 
a capital offence.128 While this was abolished in 1820,129 Emily Kadens has argued, 
“the role of discharge as an innovation that changed the nature of bankruptcy cannot 
be fully appreciated without taking the capital punishment provision into account.”130
In Canada, there have been parallel developments.131 While Canadian 
bankruptcy statutes have never adopted the pillory or capital punishment to deal 
with debtors, the discharge became the focus of an intense debate in the nineteenth 
century. Parliament adopted legislation in 1869132 and 1875133 and sought to make 
the discharge more difficult as decades progressed. Throughout the 1870s, Parliament 
debated whether there should be a bankruptcy law at all. Behind that question lay a 
fundamental divide over the role of the discharge. On the one hand, debtors required a 
fresh start and it was unjust to burden them with the shackles of debt for life. However, 
bankruptcy law interfered with the debtor’s higher moral duty to repay all debts. 
Notions of forgiveness competed unsuccessfully with the idea that all debts had to be 
honoured. In the end, Parliament repealed the Insolvent Act of 1875 in 1880,134 leaving
125 Jay Cohen, “The History of Imprisonment for Debt and Its Relation to the Development of 
Discharge in Bankruptcy” (1982) 3 Journal o f Legal History 153, at 156.
126 V. Markham Lester, Victorian Insolvency: Bankruptcy, Imprisonment for Debt and Company 
Winding-Up in Nineteenth Century England (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) at 17; Robert 
Weisberg, supra note 124, at 30; Ian Duffy, “English Bankrupts, 1571 -  1861” (1980) 24 
American Journal o f Legal History 283, at 287.
127 Michael Quilter, supra note 124; Charles Jordan Tabb, “The Historical Evolution of the 
Bankruptcy Discharge” (1991) 65 American Bankruptcy Law Journal 325, at 332; W. R. 
Cornish and G. de N. Clark, Law and Society in England 1750-1950 (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1989) at 231.
128 Emily Kadens, supra note 117, at 1232.
1291 George IV, c. 115 (1820).
130 Emily Kadens, supra note 117, at 1232.
131 Thomas Telfer, “Access to the Discharge in Canadian Bankruptcy Law and the New Role of 
Surplus Income: A Historical Perspective” in Charles E. F. Rickett and Thomas G. W. Telfer 
(eds.), International Perspectives on Consumers ’Access to Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003) 231; Thomas Telfer, “A Canadian ‘World without Bankruptcy Law’: 
the Failure of Bankruptcy Reform at the End of the Nineteenth Century” (2004) 8 Australian 
Journal o f Legal History 83; Thomas Telfer, “The Canadian Bankruptcy Act o f 1919: Public 
Legislation or Private Interest?” (1994-95) 24 Canadian Bankruptcy Law Journal 357.
132 The Insolvent Act o f1869, S.C. 1869, c. 16.
133 The Insolvent Act o f1875, S.C. 1875, c. 16.
134 An Act to Repeal the Acts Respecting Insolvency Now in Force in Canada, S.C. 1880, c. 1 ; 
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Canada without any bankruptcy law of general application until 1919.135 Repeal also 
left debtors with an opportunity to obtain a discharge.
The re-emergence of bankruptcy law after World War I raised the question 
of whether the discharge was the driving force behind the legislation. In 1919, the 
Solicitor General stood in the House of Commons and announced “one great object 
to be attained by a Bankruptcy Act in Canada is the discharge of the honest debtor”.136 
However, there was no broad consensus that the discharge was designed for the 
purpose of debtor rehabilitation.
The new acceptability of the discharge reflected the underlying interests 
of creditors who demanded reform. The Bankruptcy Act of 1919, while it enabled 
debtors to obtain their discharge, had little to do with concepts of debtor rehabilitation. 
Canada opted for a discharge because it met the legal needs of the credit community. 
Provincial legislation did not adequately deal with debtors. The absence of compulsory 
proceedings and the lack of a discharge created collection difficulties for creditors, as 
debtors often engaged in deceptive conduct. Creditors came to accept the necessity 
of the discharge as a means of improving their collection efforts. The Canadian 
Credit Men’s Trust Association (CCMTA), an organization that represented various 
authorized trustees operating under the provincial assignment statutes, was well placed 
to recognize the needs of creditors. The Bankruptcy Bill reflected their influence. 
The conservative English discharge provisions provided the ideal solution and the 
CCMTA’s solicitor, who drafted the Bill, closely followed the English model.137
Early case law that emerged shortly after enactment of the Bankruptcy Act of 
1919 reflected traditional attitudes towards the discharge. In one of the earliest discharge 
cases under the new Act, the court in Re Sceptre Hardware Co.138 concluded that, in 
discharge applications, it “must have regard not only to the interests of the bankrupt 
and his creditors, but also to the interests of the public.”139 Other cases expressed 
dissatisfaction with the operation of the discharge. Re Green140 acknowledged, “it is 
undesirable that a citizen should be so weighted down by his debts as to be incapable 
of performing the ordinary duties of citizenship.”141 However, in the same decision the
135 Bankruptcy Act o f 1919, S.C. 1919, c. 36; and,Thomas Telfer, “Access to the Discharge in 
Canadian Bankruptcy Law”, supra note 131, at 231.
136 House o f Commons Debates (2 May 1919) at 2004 (Guthrie).
137 Thomas Telfer, “The Canadian Bankruptcy Act o f 1919”, supra note 131.
138 [1923] 1 D.L.R. 1201 (Sask. K.B.).
139 Ibid., at para. 4.
140 (1925), 5 C.B.R. 580 (N.B.S.C.).
141 Ibid., at para. 3; also, Beerman v. Sands (1925), 28 O.W.N. 252 (S.C.) at para. 9. See Ex parte 
Painter; In re Painter, [1895] 1 Q.B. 85, at 88.
court concluded, “laxity in the administration” of the discharge “has been one of the 
principal causes of dissatisfaction with the present Act”142:
The Bankruptcy Court should not be converted into a sort o f clearing 
house for the liquidation of debts irrespective of the circumstances under 
which they were contracted. It is not to be regarded as a sort of charitable 
institution.143
In Re Harold M. Young,144 the court cited the preamble to the 1543 English 
Act and noted that, in the early history of bankruptcy law, a bankrupt was considered 
“in the light of criminal or offender.”145 Repeating the “clearing house” principle from 
Re Green, Barry, C.J in Re Young wrote: “I am tired of listening to the appeals of 
counsel who come here and plead for the discharge of the “poor debtor,” completely 
ignoring the rights of the poor creditors, almost, it would seem, as if creditors have no 
rights at all in bankruptcy legislation.”146
Barry C.J. condemned the number of debtors who used bankruptcy courts to 
clear debts only to return:
It would be of the worst possible example if a debtor could come to the 
Bankruptcy Court with a plausible story, obtain his discharge as a matter 
of course, depart the Court with a light heart, and having paid his creditors 
little or nothing, proceed at once to accumulate another array of creditors, 
whom, when the proper time arrived, when his credit was exhausted, he 
would probably treat in the same manner.147
Not all early cases took such a negative view of debtors and the discharge. 
In 1925, the court in Re Newsomem  was of the view that “one of the objects of the 
Bankruptcy Act was to enable an honest debtor, who had been unfortunate in business, 
in securing a discharge, so that he might make a new start.”149 While Re Newsome 
expressly adopted rehabilitation as the purpose of the discharge, it had little impact
142 Re Green (1925), 5 C.B.R. 580 (N.B.S.C.), at para. 3.
143 Ibid., at para. 4.
144 (1928), 10 C.B.R. 53, at 55 (N.B.K.B.).
145 Ibid., at para. 2.
146 Ibid., at para. 6. The clearing house principle in Re Green and Re Young have at times been 
cited in modem jurisprudence. See Re Legault (1994), 112 D.L.R. (4th) 666 (B.C.C.A.); 
Re Spooner (1968), 63 C.B.R. (N.S.) 172 (Sask. Q.B.); Re Posner (1960), 67 Man. R. 288 
(Q.B.); In re Palach, [1955] O.W.N. 278 (S.C.); Re Campbell (1982), 45 C.B.R. (N.S.) 188 
(Sask. Q.B.).
147 Ibid., at para 11.
148 (1925), 8 C.B.R. 279 (Ont. S.C.).
149 Ibid., at para. 11.
at the time, given the other prevailing judicial attitudes. In many respects, this 1925 
decision was well ahead of its time. Few cases relied upon Newsome between 1925 
and 1939.150 It has had greater appeal in more modem jurisprudence.151
Indeed, courts had few opportunities to express their views on the discharge 
between 1919 and 1949. During this period, bankrupts had to initiate their own 
application for a discharge. Large numbers did not apply for their discharge during 
this era. Debtors might not have realized that they had to apply. Even if they had the 
knowledge, cost might have provided a barrier. Further, debtors could have believed 
that discharge would be of little use because they had so little property that creditors 
might seize.152 By 1949, Parliament removed the need for a discharge application, 
making the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings an automatic application for a 
discharge.153 The creation of an automatic discharge reflected a fundamental shift in 
attitude and allowed rehabilitation of the debtor to become a more significant theme 
in bankruptcy policy.
In 1952, the Supreme Court of Canada handed down its unanimous ruling 
in Industrial Acceptance Corp. v. Lalonde.154 While English courts155 and the United 
States Supreme Court156 had given emphasis to the importance of the discharge as 
rehabilitation in earlier cases, the Lalonde case marked the first Supreme Court of 
Canada decision on the purpose of the discharge.157 While it was not the first Canadian 
decision for the rehabilitation principle,158 the case marked an important statement 
by the Court. Although Justice Rand did not write a concurring judgment, he was a
150 Re Frederick (1939), 20 C.B.R. 157 (Sask. K.B.), at para. 1; Re Stadelman (1939), 21 C.B.R.
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153 The Bankruptcy Act, 1949, 2nd Sess. (Can.), c. 7, s. 127(1).
154 [1952] 2 S.C.R. 109.
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member of the panel. Justice James Estey wrote for the court: “the purpose and object 
of the Bankruptcy Act is to equitably distribute the assets of the debtor and to permit 
of his rehabilitation as a citizen, unfettered by past debts.”159 The court balanced the 
“rehabilitation as a citizen” principle with the notion that the discharge was not a 
“matter of right” and that the Act indicated, “in certain cases the debtor should suffer 
a period of probation.”160 On the other hand, the Court recognized that an absolute 
refusal of a discharge should only be imposed where the conduct of the debtor had 
been “particularly reprehensible, or in what have been described as extreme cases.”161 
Unfortunately, Justice Estey did not cite any cases in support of these propositions so 
it was impossible to tell what specifically influenced the Court.
Lalonde has had a significant impact on modem bankruptcy jurisprudence. 
The British Columbia Court of Appeal in Gatzke v. Doucette162 described Lalonde as 
the “leading authority in Canada on discharges.”163 Lalonde has been cited by eighteen 
first instance cases, three provincial courts of appeal164 and twice by the Supreme Court 
of Canada.165 In Vachon v. Canada (Employment & Immigration Commission) ,166 the 
Court declared that the distribution of the debtor’s assets was not the sole purpose of 
bankruptcy law. Relying upon Lalonde, the Court in Vachon affirmed the rehabilitation 
principle.167
Although Justice Rand participated in the hearing and signed onto the 
unanimous ruling in Lalonde, the case did not provide any insight into his thinking on 
the discharge. However, in a lesser-known decision issued some four years later, he 
articulated his own vision of the purpose of bankruptcy legislation. In Re Moratorium 
Act,168 the Court was asked to rule on the constitutional validity of the Saskatchewan 
Moratorium Act.169 The terms of the provincial legislation enabled the Lieutenant 
Governor to postpone payment of debts. In addition, the legislation permitted the 
suspension of proceedings or the prohibition of any legal or extra-legal process against 
the debtor’s property. The Court had to decide whether such provincial legislation 
interfered with the Dominion power over bankruptcy and insolvency. In a unanimous
159 Industrial Acceptance Corp. v. Lalonde, [1952] 2 S.C.R. 109, at para. 34.
160 Ibid.
161 Ibid.
162 (1990), 79 C.B.R. (N.S.) 67 (B.C.C.A.). See also Re Arthur (1996), 45 C.B.R. (3d) 66 (B.C. 
S.C.).
163 Gatzke v. Doucette (1990), 79 C.B.R. (N.S.) 67 (B.C.C.A.), at para. 15.
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(N.S.) 305 (B.C.C.A.); Irwin (Re) (1994), 112 D.L.R. (4th) 164 (B.C.C.A).
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7-0 ruling, the Court held that the provincial legislation was ultra vires. The case 
remains better known for its contribution to the division of powers jurisprudence than 
for its contribution to discharge policy.170
In separate reasons for judgment, Justice Rand articulated the important 
distinction between bankruptcy and insolvency:
Each of the two words, bankruptcy and insolvency, must be given its full 
force. Bankruptcy is a well-understood procedure by which an insolvent 
debtor’s property is coercively brought under a judicial administration in 
the interests primarily of the creditor.
Insolvency, on the other hand, seems to be a broader term that contemplates 
measures of dealing with the property of debtors unable to pay their debts 
in other modes or arrangements as well.171
From a constitutional perspective, Justice Rand concluded that, if a “province 
steps in and assumes the general protection of the debtor... it is acting in relation to 
insolvency and assuming the function of Parliament.”172 While Justice Rand was not 
the first to consider the distinction between bankruptcy and insolvency,173 his judgment 
remains influential in constitutional jurisprudence. In 2001, the Supreme Court of 
Canada in Sam Lévy & Associés Inc. v. Azco Mining Inc.174 quoted from Justice Rand’s 
definition in order to determine the meaning of bankruptcy within s. 91(21) of the 
Constitution Act.
A less well-known aspect of Re Moratorium Act was Justice Rand’s own 
articulation of the purpose of the discharge. Justice Rand concluded that, to bankruptcy 
proceedings:
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...not only a personal stigma may attach but restrictions on freedom in 
future business activity may result. The relief to the debtor consists in the 
cancellation of debts which, otherwise, might effectually prevent him from 
rehabilitating himself economically and socially.175
He also articulated the purpose of insolvency legislation. With insolvency 
mechanisms a debtor might “avoid technical bankruptcy without too great prejudice 
to creditors and hardship to debtors” and “these means of salvage from the ravages of 
misfortune are of the essence of insolvency legislation.”176
Justice Rand’s decision stood in sharp contrast to earlier prevailing attitudes 
toward the discharge. While it followed Lalonde, in many ways Justice Rand’s thinking 
on the discharge was broader. First, he recognized the “personal stigma” that attached 
to a bankrupt, something the court in Lalonde had not done. Courts have continued 
to recognize the stigma of personal bankruptcy in modem jurisprudence.177 Secondly, 
he concluded that bankruptcy might impose restrictions on the debtor to engage in 
business in the future. Thirdly, he understood that, without a release of the bankrupt’s 
debts, a debtor would be unable to rehabilitate himself “economically and socially.”178 
Although Lalonde also recognized the rehabilitation principle, Justice Rand did not 
qualify that principle as the Court had done in Lalonde. Finally, when setting out his 
definition of insolvency law, Justice Rand considered the broad purpose of insolvency 
provisions. If bankruptcy was a coercive procedure to bring the control of assets into 
a single proceeding, insolvency provisions were designed to avoid the consequences 
of a bankruptcy. Justice Rand concluded that insolvency provisions were the “means 
of salvage from the ravages of misfortune.”179 Such a statement rejected the traditional 
attitude towards debtors. Justice Rand recognized that debtors failed or approached 
bankruptcy through the “ravages of misfortune”, rather than through some fault of 
their own or some moral failing.
While most courts and legal scholars have focused on Re Moratorium A c t 's 
contribution to constitutional law, Justice Rand has also made a significant contribution 
to discharge jurisprudence. The Supreme Court of Canada in Sam Lévy & Associés Inc. 
v. Azco Mining Inc.m  concluded that Justice Rand’s judgment contained “important
175 Re Moratorium Act ,[1956] S.C.R. 31, at 46.
176 Ibid., at 46; and Re Drummie (2002), 37 C.B.R. (4th) 241 (N.B. Q.B.), at para. 16..
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‘public policy’ objectives of bankruptcy legislation.”181 The Ontario Court of Appeal, 
in relying upon Re Moratorium Act, articulated those public policy objectives:
An important purpose of bankruptcy legislation is to encourage the 
rehabilitation of an honest but unfortunate debtor, and to permit his or her 
re-integration into society — subject to reasonable conditions — by obtaining 
a discharge from the continued burden of crushing financial obligations 
which cannot be m et.182
Justice Rand’s articulation of the discharge as rehabilitation rejected the 
traditional view that the debtor’s financial failure was attributed to some moral failure 
or that the debtor’s failure was a result of reckless behaviour designed to deceive 
creditors. In other words, the debtor’s failure was traditionally attributed to his or her 
own fault. It was that notion that Justice Rand sought to overcome in his decision.
However, in recent years the rehabilitative purpose of bankruptcy law has 
been undermined by statutory amendments. Legislative changes to the BIA have 
moved the law away from rehabilitation as the underlying theory for the discharge.183 
Straight bankruptcy followed by a discharge has been made more difficult. Debtors are 
required to meet surplus income requirements and some debtors with surplus income 
may have to remain bankrupt for a longer period. Stephanie Ben-Ishai has suggested 
that the 1997 amendments “signalled a return to the ‘debtor deviant’ construct” and the 
more recent 2005 and 2007 amendments “hold the potential to entrench this construct 
in Canada’s consumer bankruptcy system.”184 While the courts should not ignore the 
wording of the new provisions, the courts still have the jurisdiction to interpret the 
sections in light of Justice Rand’s economic and social rehabilitation and allow debtors 
to avoid the “ravages of misfortune.”
C) CONCLUSION
Does Justice Rand have a commercial law legacy? In the area of contracts and 
bankruptcy law one finds numerous decisions where Justice Rand was called on to 
interpret the terms of a contract or statute. These cases, of which there were many, will 
long be forgotten and make little contribution to Justice Rand’s commercial legacy.
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Most of these cases ignored larger policy questions and broke little new ground in 
the common law of contracts or in the interpretation of bankruptcy legislation. The 
question remains whether these numerous, non-descript cases outweighed his other 
contributions.
When given the right set of facts, Justice Rand sought to modify the common 
law of contracts or to articulate the policy underlying bankruptcy law. In Barnes, 
although in a minority, he provided the ‘contract in a hurry’ context to a ticket case 
involving an exclusion clause. Rather than rely upon a construction approach, as 
he had followed in earlier cases, Justice Rand criticized the owner of the shipping 
company and implicitly considered the bargaining power of the two parties. Here he 
found “virtual deception.” His reasons did not appeal to the rest of the Court. However, 
his approach may well have been ahead of his time. Modem exclusion cases, while not 
explicitly citing his Barnes judgment, implicitly adopt his approach.
Dawson remains Justice Rand’s most significant contribution to the law of 
contracts. Rejecting the notion that there was an offer of a unilateral contract, he found 
promissory intent and a binding bilateral contract. The result provided Dawson with 
a remedy and perhaps the most just result in the circumstances. The decision marked 
abandonment of a formalistic approach in favour of American authorities, providing 
Justice Rand with flexibility to find a binding bilateral contract as “instinct with 
obligation.” Both Barnes and Dawson illustrated this robust approach. The boundaries 
of the common law, the expectation interests of the parties and a just resolution were 
all in play.
In the field of bankruptcy law one finds an example of formalism at play. 
In Guillot v. Lefaivre, Justice Rand adopted a plain language approach to interpret 
the unpaid wage claim provisions in the bankruptcy statute. He declined to discuss 
the underlying objective of the provision. In contrast to this formalistic approach, 
in Re Moratorium Act, he articulated the very policy foundations of the bankruptcy 
discharge which remain influential today. It is unclear why his case law showed such 
a contrasting style.
One would have hoped that his robust approach, in constitutional law cases 
and in Barnes, Dawson and Re Reference Act, would have been applied to the numerous 
other commercial law cases. Does Justice Rand have a commercial law legacy? The 
large number of judgments, which made little or no contribution to the law of contracts 
or bankruptcy, certainly weigh against such a legacy. However, the strength in Barnes, 
Dawson and Re Reference Act on balance establishes it. Indeed, one wonders how the 
legal world would have unfolded without these significant judgments. These leading 
cases help to “complete the judicial profile” 185 of Justice Rand.
185 Jacob S. Ziegel, supra note 19, at 393.
